Book Review: Islam and Democracy in the Views of PKS and HTI

In mid-2018, when the political competition ahead of the election began to heat up, a video appeared containing an invitation to replace the president and also change the system. The sound of the takbir "Allahuakbar" that appeared afterward seemed to carry a message that the invitation was a noble mission of Islam that was important to carry out. The invitation was delivered by Ismail Yusanto, spokesman for Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), and Mardani Ali Sera, one of the top officials of PKS.

I do not want to discuss the legal aspects of the alleged treasonous invitation. Nor do I want to discuss the exploitation of religion in the public sphere, including in the realm of electoral politics. It's just that the togetherness of Mardani Ali Sera and Ismail Yusanto, who in the video appear very close, is hard to imagine happening in previous times, especially in the mid-2000s. Although both are based on the Islamic movement, both have opposing tendencies. The clash of interests between PKS and HTI was felt ahead of the general election; when PKS struggled to attract as many Muslim voters as possible, especially in urban areas and on campuses, HTI campaigned for Indonesian Muslims to reject democracy, including elections. The author experienced the cold war between them when he was active in HMI during his college days. At the campus level, the PKS and HTI umbrella organizations, namely KAMMI and Gema Pembebasan, often clashed during meetings between student organizations, especially when responding to issues that intersected with the Islamic agenda. Not infrequently, the presence of one causes the absence of another at student alliance meetings.

Why do PKS and HTI have different interpretations of democracy and elections? What is the background to these differences? Are there any similarities between them? Arief Ihsan Rathomy's book entitled PKS and HTI: Genealogy of Democratic Thought, is one of the academic works that reviews the comparison between the two organizations. Broadly speaking, this book discusses the emergence of the two Islamic organizations along with the differences in their views on democracy.
The birth of the political Islamic movement cannot be separated from several important events in Islamic countries. The first event was the occupation of the Jewish nation to the land of Palestine, which then gave rise to solidarity among Muslims almost all over the world. The victory of the Jewish nation, which then established the state of Israel, provoked the anger of Muslims. Moreover, because the occupation involved the intervention of Western countries, which in turn brought about an anti-Western attitude, including the democratic system.

Then the second event that is no less important is the eruption of the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979. The revolution driven by the Iranian clerics/mullahs seems to be an example of how Islam and the state are integrated as faith and law that regulate world affairs. Iran itself, through its charismatic figure Khomeini, aggressively 'imported' the idea of revolution in other Muslim countries in order to oppose the domination of Western countries. This revolutionary event then influenced many countries, from the Middle East to Southeast Asia, breaking through the Sunni-Shia sect barrier.

Another incident was the thwarting of the FIS (Front Islamic du Salute) party's victory in Algeria in 1991. At that time, the FIS surprisingly won the local elections, and then the first round of the national elections. The achievement of this Islamic fundamentalist party was said to have raised concerns in Western countries. The FIS victory in the second round of the election that was already in sight was canceled by the government. Meanwhile, a similar incident befell the Refah Party and its figure Necmetin Erbekan in Turkey in 1996. In the elections held the previous year, the Refah Party succeeded in bringing Erbekan to become Prime Minister. However, this success was considered to threaten secular political power. On charges of returning Islam as an ideology and opposing secularism, the Refah Party was dissolved, and Erbekan was removed from his position.

As a result of these events, the Islamic revivalist movement became increasingly convinced that to restore the glory of Islam, democracy was not a completely friendly arena to achieve these ideals. Some of the more moderate Islamic movement groups tried to learn from these mistakes by remaining within the corridor of democracy. Others, increasingly firmly in the position of rejecting democracy.

Meanwhile, domestically, the emergence of political Islamic movement groups was not only influenced by the above events, but also by the dynamics of the relationship between the state and Islam. The author of the book mentions several main events that underlie the emergence of the Islamic revivalist movement, namely the continuous defeat of political Islamic groups until before the 1980s; state repression against campus da'wah activists and Islamic circles in general in the 1980s; the beginning of the accommodation of the interests of Muslims by the state in the early 1990s, and; the fall of the New Order and the emergence of various organizations/groups as a form of democratization in 1998, including PKS and HTI.

The emergence of PKS and HTI

The emergence of PKS cannot be separated from the tarbiyah movement that began to emerge on public campuses in the mid-1970s. Salman Mosque ITB is said to be the starting point of the tarbiyah movement, through the Mujahid Dakwah Institute formed by Imaduddin Abdurahim, a former HMI activist. Ali Said Damanik (2002) said that the puritanical LMD activities invited students to realize Islam holistically and in real life. The activities were carried out using the method usrah, a small group of 5-20 people led by a ustad, who is usually the most senior student. The material is divided into two parts, namely the formation of Muslim personal character, and the formation of the character of movement activists. In its development, this movement then spread widely to other campuses in several large cities. The usrah method was apparently also carried out by the remaining members of Darul Islam who aimed to form an Islamic state in Indonesia. This made usrah activities suspected by the government, and since then Islamic preaching activities on campus have been carried out underground.

In the 1990s, when the New Order began to compromise with Islamic circles, the tarbiyah movement had succeeded in placing its people in strategic positions in student organizations on large campuses. At almost the same time, Islamic intellectuals in Indonesia began to come into contact with the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood (IM) movement in Egypt, brought by scholars who graduated from the Middle East and Egypt who were previously initiated by the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council (DDiI). This organization was formed by Mohammad Natsir not long after the New Order rejected the desire to rehabilitate the Masyumi Party. These Middle Eastern graduates were then actively involved in the tarbiyah movement on campuses, and were actively publishing books written by IM figures such as Sayyid Quthb, Hasal Al Banna, and others.

When the New Order finally fell, activists in the tarbiyah movement took advantage of the momentum of socio-political change by establishing the Justice Party, which in 2003 changed its name to the Prosperous Justice Party.

Meanwhile, the forerunner of HTI is more or less similar to PKS. Its spread in Indonesia is believed to have occurred in the early 1980s through Abdurrahman Al Baghdadi, an Australian HT activist of Jordanian descent, to the Al Ghazali Islamic boarding school in Bogor. His arrival in Indonesia was at the request of the owner of the Islamic boarding school, Abdullah bin Nuh, a lecturer at the University of Indonesia, to settle and teach at his boarding school. As part of the international movement of Hizbut Tahrir, the idea of establishing an Islamic caliphate became a central theme. Like the tarbiyah group, the spread of HTI ideas was through campus mosques, in this case the Al Ghifari Mosque at IPB. The process of spreading HTI ideas was carried out secretly because of the repressive nature of the New Order government towards Islamic groups. In addition to forming religious studies in the form of halaqahs, its activists also published bulletins such as Al-Wa'ie and Islam. Not long after, the ideas brought by HT spread to other campuses, such as Unpad, UI, ITB, Unhas, Unair and others. The climate of freedom of association and opinion after Suharto fell made the HTI group dare to convey the idea of the Islamic caliphate widely, competing with other national ideas that also emerged. The International Conference of the Islamic Caliphate in 2000 in Senayan marked the open existence of HTI.

PKS and HTI: Their Views on Democracy

In the discourse of the relationship between Islam and the state, the issue of people's sovereignty has always been a debate because recognition of it is often interpreted as negating the sources of law inherited from the prophet, namely the Qur'an and Hadith. In principle, PKS does not agree with people's sovereignty in the context of the voice of the people is the voice of God, because true sovereignty belongs to Allah. The argument for this opinion is based on the belief in Islam that nature and all its contents are God's creations. Thus, every Muslim is obliged to carry out the Sharia (rules) that have been determined by Allah, and must reject rules made by humans, especially those that conflict with Sharia. However, PKS believes that currently there is no ideal system that can guarantee the implementation of Allah's laws after the era of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions. Therefore, Muslims must take advantage of the available options, including the democratic system that is in effect today. By utilizing the democratic system, PKS's struggle is so that people's sovereignty, which is the basic principle of democracy, does not conflict with Allah's sovereignty. In this regard, PKS's involvement in the democratic system is in order to influence policy making so that policy products do not conflict with Sharia.

PKS's involvement in democracy is based on the principle that Islam demands that every Muslim pay attention to all the problems of the people by utilizing democratic means. PKS's involvement in democracy certainly has consequences, including decision-making through majority vote. In principle one man one vote mentioned, it is not impossible for democracy to produce leaders or policies that are far from Islamic law, such as issues regarding LGBT, legalization of gambling, and the like. In order for the product of democracy to produce policies that are in accordance with Sharia, placing as many people's representatives in parliament as possible is important.

According to PKS, there is a value compatibility between Islam and democracy. First, there is space for participation. Although democracy is not a system that originates from Islam, democracy is a gateway for preaching, which allows the involvement of the people in managing the government. Then the second value compatibility is that in democracy there is space to remind each other and give advice. In this case, democracy allows the people to correct their representatives or leaders if their policies deviate from Islamic values. Meanwhile, regarding gender equality in politics, PKS believes that women's involvement in parliament is still permitted, with the exception of the presidential position.

In general, PKS's moderate thinking on democracy is greatly influenced by figures from the Muslim Brotherhood (IM) in Egypt, such as Hasan Al Banna and Yusuf Qardhawi. PKS's opinion on democracy as a means to carry out da'wah and improve the problems of the people is the result of Al Banna's thinking. The usrah method as a means of Islamic study is also inspired by the thoughts of the IM figure. Meanwhile, Yusuf Qardhawi's thinking that influenced PKS in viewing democracy is Priority Fiqh. This fiqh is the basis for PKS to make compromises and tolerance for various realities that exist today, namely political systems that are kufr or not in accordance with Islamic Sharia. The involvement of Muslims in the secular political system is not only interpreted as part of preventing worse evil, but as a long-term strategy to create a true Islamic system.

Meanwhile, HTI has its own views on democracy. If PKS is heavily influenced by IM figures, HTI's attitude and views on democracy are influenced by its main figures and founders, especially Taqiyuddin Nabhani and Abdul Qadim Zallum. From the perspective of these two people, HT organizationally believes that the rules in democracy are not known in Islam, so the use of the term can cause confusion of interpretation, which has the potential to conflict with Islam. The main incompatibility between Islam and democracy is in the principle of people's sovereignty. In democracy, what the people want is the source of law, while in Islam, the source of law is only from Allah. That is why HT views democracy as a kufr system because it does not originate from Islam.

Politically, HT believes that democracy is a cover for Western infidel countries to colonize Muslim countries, thus anyone who supports democracy is supporting the colonization efforts of Western countries. Being involved in democracy also means delaying the goal of creating a political and governmental system based on Islam. The consequence of this attitude is that HT refuses to participate in democracy. This attitude applies to all HT branches in any country. HT's main political agenda is to overhaul the entire democratic system in force, and replace it with a system that is in accordance with Islamic provisions with the Qur'an as a legal guideline.

Apart from the influence of the thoughts of Taqiyuddin Nabhani and Abdul Qadim Zallum, HT also seems to have been influenced by the views of other Islamic thinkers, especially Sayid Qutb and Al Maududi. The influence of Qutb, who was one of the IM figures, is visible in HT's views regarding the terms democracy and the source of sovereignty. For Qutb, a Muslim must place Islam above all man-made ideologies, because all man-made things are temporal and can change at any time, while Islamic teachings, which regulate all affairs, are valid throughout time. Qutb's view of sovereignty is in line with Al Maududi. According to him, recognizing the sovereignty of the people as a source of law means setting aside the power of God. Therefore, Al Maududi said that popular sovereignty in democracy is something that creates partners with God, or even eliminates God altogether.

A Note

Islam and democracy in Indonesia have always been interesting topics to study. Of course, in a country with the largest Muslim population in the world, direct democracy is practiced. Even so, it does not mean that democracy has been accepted by all its people, because history also shows that along the way, disruptions to democracy have occurred several times. The presence of this book complements one of these disruptions, by making PKS and HTI as objects.
The views of PKS and HTI on democracy are greatly influenced by intellectual figures from Egypt and the Middle East, which makes both of them have a more critical view in assessing democracy. Therefore, the character of both of them is also different from organizations or political parties based on Muslim voters in Indonesia, such as NU, Muhammadiyah, PPP, PAN, PKB and others. These organizations and political parties can be said to have accepted democracy, borrowing Przeworski's term (1991), as 'the only rule of the town'.

PKS's acceptance of people's sovereignty seems vague because the owner of sovereignty is God. However, because democracy has become an unavoidable objective reality, PKS has compromised that involvement in democracy is temporary while conducting da'wah and improving regulations to comply with Islamic law. Unfortunately, even though the author of the book obtained primary data through interviews with key PKS figures, no examples of PKS's role in the democratic system with such a perspective are mentioned. As a result, the difference between PKS and other political parties is not visible, even when compared to fellow political parties based on Islamic voters. However, if we look at the year of publication of this book, namely 2006, perhaps there is nothing that can be shown because it was only two years after the 2004 election, the first election after transforming into PKS, which then produced a faction in the DPR. One thing that needs to be noted is that PKS's acceptance of democracy is temporary, because an ideal system based on Islam has not existed since the era of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions. Therefore, it is not wrong to say that there is something latent in PKS, namely that this party has the potential to betray democracy.

Meanwhile, HTI, on the other hand, refuses to participate in democracy. In principle, HTI cannot accept the sovereignty of the people in democracy, which is considered to set aside, or even eliminate God's sovereignty altogether. This attitude is full of ideological content, especially the values of monotheism. One interesting thing about the description of this book is that in its development, HT, at least in Indonesia, has slightly shifted its views on its involvement in the democratic system. In an interview between the author of the book and one of the sources from HTI, it was stated that it is not impossible that one day HTI will participate as a political party participating in the election. This is in line with the fact that several HT activists have individually become members of parliament in several countries. This shift in attitude is actually not too surprising because history shows that HT had asked for permission to be established as a political party from the Jordanian government. The request was rejected. A right decision even when they were not yet organized and propagating an anti-democratic attitude.