Book Review: A Piece of Sjahrir's Mosaic in Parapat

During a recent visit to North Sumatra, Erwinton and Mr. Ade, I retraced Bung Karno's footsteps when he was exiled by the Dutch: Visiting Bung Karno's Rest House. It happened to be August, the month when all Indonesians commemorate independence. The rest house, located in Parapat, Simalungun Regency, is an old European-style house that is predominantly white, and directly faces Lake Toba. While observing the historic building, I also traced the story behind the rest house through my gadget. Based on the investigation, it turns out that Sukarno was not alone in being exiled in the house in 1949. The 'Son of the Dawn' was exiled there with Agus Salim and Sutan Sjahrir.

A question then came to my mind: Why was the place named Pesanggrahan Sukarno? Why not Pesanggrahan Para Bapak Bangsa? Perhaps Mohammad Hatta, the person who was appointed as vice president accompanying Sukarno, was not exiled there. Or, as the cliché answer goes, the course of history is determined and told by the winners. In this context, Agus Salim and Sutan Sjahrir, like it or not, were not winners in Indonesian history. However, I think we both know that Sukarno was indeed different from his two fellow exiles. He was considered a leader of a populist nationalist group who was good at giving speeches that fired up the masses. Meanwhile, Agus Salim was a former activist of the Islamic Association who was identical to the figure of Cokroaminoto. Meanwhile, Sjahrir was known as a figure who was indeed different, if not to say opposite, politically from Sukarno.

A Man of Paradox

Sutan Sjahrir, wrote Daniel Dhakidae (2017:193), was a man of paradox in various forms. His body posture is small, but his intelligence is brilliant. Unlike Sukarno who prioritized rhetoric and mobilization of the people, the political movement of 'Little Brother' prioritized political education, especially for educated youth. It is not surprising that the Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI) founded by Sjahrir is referred to as a collection of intellectuals.

The story of Sjahrir in the course of Indonesian history has been reviewed quite a lot by Indonesianists. One of them is the book Intellectuals and the Struggle for Independence: The Role of the Sjahrir Group written by JD Legge. Before this book was published, there were at least two different spectrums in considering Sjahrir's position in the years of the proclamation of independence. George McT. Kahin stands on a spectrum that positions Sjahrir as an influential figure in the days leading up to the proclamation of independence and after. In his work Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, first published in 1952, Kahin presents Sjahrir as the architect of the shift in the system of government from presidential to parliamentary.

On the other spectrum, Ben Anderson in Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance 1944-1946, first published in 1972, actually assumed that Sjahrir and his supporters were only on the fringes of the country's political power, not the core area. Two days before the proclamation, for example, Sjahrir did not show his face at all. Cynically, Anderson even considered the position of prime minister that Sjahrir obtained as nothing more than a "silent coup". Furthermore, the negotiations conducted by Sjahrir were considered to be contrary to the will for independence that was integrated with social change. In Anderson's view, Sjahrir and his supporters were merely a group of intellectuals alienated from society. At this point, they did not have a great influence in directing public opinion. For Anderson, the radical youth of the capital, most of whom considered Tan Malaka as a leader, were the most influential group in the history of the proclamation of independence.

From this explanation, we can conclude that Kahin sympathized with Sjahrir and his group, while Anderson actually sided more with Tan Malaka and his followers. The difference in time and primary sources of research plays an important role in explaining these two contrasting perspectives. Kahin had the opportunity to write about the course of the independence revolution through 'first hand', namely Sjahrir himself. Meanwhile, Anderson, about twenty years after Kahin's work appeared, made a group of young people who were enthusiastic about welcoming various possibilities that occurred when they received news that Japan had lost the war as the epicenter of his research. In other words, Anderson was able to study Kahin's work, and easily map out the strengths and weaknesses both substantively and methodologically, and contrast them with the events that were revealed afterwards.

As a research product, this book attempts to review Sjahrir's role in the history of Indonesian independence. In the introduction, Legge touches on several important hypotheses related to Sjahrir's role. Among these hypotheses, the most important hypothesis is Sjahrir's role during the Japanese occupation. At that time, Sjahrir was known as someone who refused to cooperate with Japan. Some people say that the position he took was part of a tactical strategy for achieving Indonesian independence, which had been negotiated with Sukarno and Hatta. After going through various considerations, it was agreed that Sukarno and Hatta would cooperate and accept the positions given by Japan while manipulating various activities as much as possible for the purpose of achieving independence. Meanwhile, Sjahrir moved underground to organize youth for the same purpose.

One of the fundamental questions raised in this book is how 'underground' was Sjahrir's movement at that time, considering that he was never captured by the Japanese? Sjahrir's activities in making visits to various places, as well as political discussions with young people were clearly monitored by the Japanese. However, unlike Amir Sjarifuddin who was captured and sentenced to death - Sukarno and Hatta later asked the Japanese to change the sentence to prison - Sjahrir was free to move around gathering his supporters, indicating that the figure was indeed not considered important by the Japanese. At this point, Anderson's conclusion about Sjahrir may be correct.

Legge does not pretend to provide a direct answer or rebuttal to Anderson's conclusion. This may be due to the limited primary data sources, considering that the research for this book was conducted in the mid-1980s, and not many historical actors are still alive. Legge then focuses on the profiles of his supporters, and how the group was formed and played a role later on, by interviewing people who were considered close to or part of Sjahrir's group: Theoretical thinking as a guide to action, and tendencies that are closely related to Western democratic values, which are often identified with the term 'PSI school'.

With such categorization, Legge then divided the two time periods to map the people called Sjahrir's group. The first group were people related to the Indonesian National Education, or often known as the New PNI. Since the organization was disbanded and its leaders were exiled to several places, Sjahrir continued to maintain communication with a number of its former members, discussing many things starting from the political situation, both domestically and abroad, including observing the course of the war that was happening due to the emergence of fascism in Europe and its consequences for the goal of independence. In Sjahrir's view, the emergence of fascism as an evolution of the contradiction of capitalism was a major threat to Indonesian independence, even greater than the Netherlands. Thus, when Japan took control of Indonesia, he had already positioned it as a real threat.

The second group was the younger generation of the first group. Not long after the arrival of the Japanese, Sjahrir recruited new members through his old contacts in the New PNI. In quite detail, Legge maps the various youth organizations carried out by Sjahrir's group: Andi Zainal formed his own association and group in Jakarta, and later in Makassar; Sulistiyo and Hamid Algidiri in Surabaya; Ruslan Abdulgani and Murdianto formed a discussion group among high school students who secretly called for the rejection of 'Japanization' in educational activities; Sudarsono, Soegra, and Sukanda in Cirebon formed an organization whose influence reached Pekalongan; Soebadio in Tegal; Soenarto in Brebes; and also quite importantly, Djohan Syahroezah, Sjahrir's nephew and loyalist, organized and formed an oil workers' union in Wonokromo and Cepu, East Java.

Meanwhile, in the capital, recruitment of young people was directed at various student dormitories that existed at that time. Anderson explained that there were at least three dormitories that became centers of political activities during the Japanese occupation, namely the medical student dormitory in Prapatan 10, the New Generation Dormitory in Menteng 31, and the Free Indonesia Dormitory in Kebon Sirih 80. Some people said that the Prapatan 10 Dormitory was identical to the youth group that followed Sjahrir. This opinion was based on at least two things. First, compared to the other two dormitories, the Prapatan 10 Dormitory was a dormitory that did not have close ties to the Japanese occupation government.

Second, most of the students of the Medical College came from elite circles who were quite fluent in Dutch, and had pro-Western tendencies during the Pacific War. However, Legge argued, the young people recruited to become Sjahrir's followers could not be clearly separated from other youth groups, because these groups often worked together on various occasions. However, Legge continued, among the forms of symbolic resistance against Japan, the ones that received quite a lot of attention were the lecture strikes carried out by Soedjatmoko, Soedarpo, Soebianto, and several other names who were indeed part of Sjahrir's group. In addition to the three names above, several Sjahrir recruits who later played important roles in the dynamics of domestic politics were Ali Budiardjo, TB Simatupang, and Hamid Algadri.

From his description, Legge stated that the underground activities and recruitment carried out by Sjahrir and his group were not based on a coherent ideology, but rather a loose organization carried out through personal contacts. The relationship between the youth and Sjahrir was more of a friendship, where someone who already knew them, observed and selected other students who were considered to have potential or had a higher political awareness, to then introduce them to Sjahrir. One thing that was typical of the underground activities and discussion groups that were formed was that they viewed the international situation from the perspective of the conflict between democracy and fascism, and positioned Japan in the fascist camp.

However, at that time there was no effective resistance movement with a broad base and centralized leadership, no organized violence, no guerrilla activities, and even no strikes as had happened during the Dutch occupation. Sjahrir's underground activities were to prepare for independence, not to confront Japan directly. The preparations were in the form of recruiting young people and formulating long-term strategies, which were carried out on the basis of Indonesian National Education but with various adjustments to the situation, with a strong belief that Japan's defeat was inevitable.

The Glitter of a Meteor That Disappears Instantly

For me, what needs to be noted is that Sjahrir's underground activities were not just preparations for independence, but also building a political base for himself. After the proclamation, when the Central Indonesian National Committee was formed, Sjahrir was already considered a figure who was considered to represent the views of influential educated youth. He increasingly reaped the results when he proposed changing the presidential system to a parliamentary system, which meant reducing the president's power. This proposal was approved by President Sukarno for at least two reasons. First, domestically, Tan Malaka began to show ambitions for power to replace Sukarno's position. For Sukarno, it was better to cooperate with Sjahrir by giving him the position of prime minister, even though he had harshly criticized him as an element of Japanese fascists in the first republican government, rather than facing Tan Malaka and his increasingly widespread and radical group directly.

Second, Indonesia, which had just become independent at that time, needed to present a figure known to be anti-fascist to negotiate with the Netherlands. That way, Indonesia could avoid accusations of being a puppet state formed by Japan. With Sukarno's approval, Sjahrir was appointed as Indonesia's first Prime Minister at the age of 36, who then led the negotiations as part of an effort to maintain independence. This was not only in line with his political interests and skills, but also demonstrated the precision of Sjahrir's political vision that he had demonstrated since his exile.

Unfortunately, Sjahrir's political career and activities then faded because the party he founded did not get much support during the 1955 election. PSI only got five seats in the central parliament, far below PNI, Masyumi, NU, and PKI. One of the causes was Sjahrir's political choice which did not transform his party from a cadre party to a mass party. Maybe that was also the reason why not many people knew Sjahrir, so the exile house in Parapat was named Pesanggrahan Bung Karno, not Bung Sjahrir. Perhaps what Tempo magazine (2009) wrote in a special edition was true: Sjahrir was a meteor whose light shone on the political stage, then disappeared in an instant.