{"id":6699,"date":"2023-01-17T13:28:59","date_gmt":"2023-01-17T06:28:59","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/populicenter.org\/?p=6699"},"modified":"2023-02-08T15:53:24","modified_gmt":"2023-02-08T08:53:24","slug":"dki-jakarta-kekuasaan-dan-populisme","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/populicenter.org\/en\/2023\/01\/17\/dki-jakarta-kekuasaan-dan-populisme\/","title":{"rendered":"DKI Jakarta, Power, and Populism"},"content":{"rendered":"

Compared to other regions in Indonesia, DKI Jakarta is a tempting magnet for fortune-tellers from all over the archipelago. Until the time this article was written, DKI Jakarta is still a unified political and economic node. Region Sudirman Central Business District<\/em> (SCBD) for example, it can be said that big businesses in Indonesia are run in this area, besides of course the Kuningan area (Asiatoday.id, 09\/07\/2022). On the political aspect, all political party headquarters are in DKI Jakarta. Parliament and of course the executive are also in DKI Jakarta. All of these concentrations place DKI Jakarta as the center of national attention. Two executives in DKI Jakarta are no exception, namely the national executive (President, Vice President, and Ministers) and local\/provincial executives (Governor of DKI Jakarta).<\/p>\n

The Populi Center in 2022 has conducted surveys twice in DKI Jakarta Province. The main focus of the survey was on how the programs that had been carried out by Anies Baswedan as the Governor of DKI Jakarta at that time were assessed by members of the public. The first survey was conducted in February with the result that many DKI Jakarta residents chose Anies Baswedan as the future Governor of DKI Jakarta with 47.5 percent, and as President in 2024 with 29 percent. The second survey was conducted in October with relatively unchanged results. Anies Baswedan remains the dominant figure chosen by the people of DKI Jakarta as the future Governor of DKI Jakarta with 66.2 percent. What is different from the first survey, in this second survey, we asked for an assessment of Anies Baswedan's policies as the Governor of DKI Jakarta.<\/p>\n

The results showed that the three policies that received the highest satisfaction were Taman Maju Bersama (RPTRA) with 84.2 percent, Street Lighting (81.9 percent), Jakarta Healthy Card (KJS) Plus (80.3 percent), while the three policies that received the lowest satisfaction was Reclamation of North Jakarta Beach (42.7 percent), Implementation of Formula E (42.7 percent), and DP House 0 (33.3 percent) (Populi Center, 19\/10\/2022). Interestingly, the campaign promises that were heralded when Anies Baswedan campaigned in the 2017 Governor Election (Pilgub) actually received a bad assessment. Even though compared to the campaign promises of his competitors, namely Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (BTP) and Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono (AHY), Anies Baswedan's campaign promises were long ago considered unrealistic (Kompas, 28\/08\/2022; BBC, 18\/03\/ 2021). Even though he received a bad rating, Anies Baswedan still received a positive assessment from the community.<\/p>\n

This is certainly strange and seems odd. The basic question is, where did the BTP voters go in the second round of the 2017 DKI Jakarta gubernatorial election? How is it possible for someone who failed to fulfill his campaign promise to get a positive assessment? At the very least, these results reinforce an understanding that is sometimes biased by social class, we must understand that politics is not necessarily related to rationality, there are also personal sentiments built into it. Besides that, Anies Baswedan's superiority is not surprising, in the midst of DKI Jakarta's abundant budget, Anies Baswedan does not have a serious figure with a long track record of integrity. Giring from the Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI) is certainly not a figure who can seriously challenge Anies Baswedan, even so with BTP the door to return to sitting as Governor of DKI Jakarta is very small, if not to be called tightly closed.<\/p>\n

In addition to the issue of Anies Baswedan's electability which is quite high. What can we notice from the two Populi Center survey results in 2022? At the very least, these results prompt us to look at two main things. First, we need to reorganize our assumptions about rational, policy-based urban voters. Second, we need to see again that in the end the populism that colored the 2017 DKI Jakarta Pilgub was only a campaign tool. At that time the power was clearly visible, bright, showing the character of ruthlessness. The hard clash in society with religious sentiments was enjoyed by the elite who were ultimately powerless to realize their own campaign promises.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

The Snare of Populism Practices<\/strong><\/p>\n

Populism has many forms, but if we use a general definition to explain it, populism can be understood as a narrative that is usually carried out by political elites with the aim of showing a clash between the dominant elites who are considered to have betrayed the people, especially the dominant social class which is generally the dominant class. middle to lower social class (Muhtadi, 2019; Triwibowo & Martha, 2021). Usually elites who use populist political styles are charismatic elites who have amazing narrative abilities. The problem is, there is a tendency for populist leaders to bring narratives that from a political standpoint defend the lower social class, but in the end it is difficult to implement (Imawan, 2020). In the example of the 2017 DKI Jakarta Pilgub, the promise regarding the 0 percent DP House Program is one of them.<\/p>\n

Looking at the empirical reality seen through the survey in October, we can understand that the populism built by Anies Baswedan was only used as a media campaign, only as a way to get the seat for Governor of DKI Jakarta. The difference in attitude is most easily seen in the 2017 DKI Jakarta Pilgub event, Anies Baswedan enjoys his association with the 212 movement, the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), as well as the post-212 movement group in the form of PA 212 (Triantoro, 2019; Tempo, 10\/08\/2020; Hamid, 2019). When the opportunity to become President arose, both PA 212 and Anies Baswedan tried not to associate one with the other (Tribun News, 03\/12\/2021; CNN Indonesia, 01\/12\/2022). In this context, I think Anies Baswedan understands that national leadership requires pluralist leadership, not leadership based on certain ethnic, racial and religious sentiments.<\/p>\n

The wound to the use of religious sentiments in the 2017 DKI Jakarta gubernatorial election has brought deep wounds. When on several occasions I communicated with academic friends in East Nusa Tenggara (NTT) and in North Sulawesi (North Sulawesi), it appears that the 2017 DKI Jakarta Pilgub was considered by many to be the most disgusting and unethical Pilgub, considering that power was taken by hurting Indonesian pluralism . But what can be said, history has been recorded, and what further questions can be taken from this event. From an academic perspective, there is a big question, how can the narrative of religious populism that has been attached to Anies Baswedan be separated and turned into populism that is closer to clashes of social classes?<\/p>\n

When Joko Widodo (Jokowi) progressed from Mayor of Solo to Governor of DKI Jakarta, to finally becoming President of the Republic of Indonesia, Jokowi at that time used populist methods by emphasizing the importance of nationalization or national independence. We still know how the narrative of the SMK car that is echoed will become a national car (Kompas, 16\/02\/2021). Regardless of the pros and cons of SMK cars, the populism built by Jokowi is of course very different from the populism built by Anies Baswedan. Jokowi, when he became a national elite, never used religious narratives, instead a communicative approach which often became an obstacle to implementing policies, succeeded in becoming a way to overcome deadlocks <\/em>development. Approach blusukan, <\/em>indirectly shows how Indonesia's problems are in the aspects of policy implementation and communication between social classes. The populism brought by Jokowi is closer to populism style <\/em>charismatic leader in Latin America with a dominant narrative of nationalization.<\/p>\n

The shift from the image of religious populism attached to the figure of Anies Baswedan, like it or not, has become the scourge of his ambition to be elected as a national leader in the future. No matter how hard Anies Baswedan wants to strip this image, this narrative will continue to exist, especially in the era of socio-political-economic life where technology has been widely used as a medium for daily interaction. It is difficult for anyone to let go of the digital footprints that surround him, therefore as long as the narrative of religious populism is still attached to Anies Baswedan, it will be difficult for him to rebuild the narrative of pluralist leaders he once built while serving as rector of Paramadina University.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

The Evolution of Populism<\/strong><\/p>\n

I would like to close the final round of this paper with a question which I think is important to contemplate on the concept of populism that we have so far understood. In general, discourses related to populism emphasize charismatic leaders and narratives against oppressive elites. Usually the elites who are considered to be oppressive are the elites who are in power. The question is, should it always be populist leaders who emphasize that previous leaders were oppressive leaders? How about contesting the elections in 2024? However, regardless of the pros and cons, President Jokowi has in several ways implemented populist policies while still balancing power, especially the friction between elites. With this position, does every candidate who wants to run as a presidential candidate have to say that President Jokowi is being tyrannical towards the people?<\/p>\n

The narrative that says Jokowi is despotic towards the people, might work if Jokowi is also a contestant in the upcoming elections. Considering that Jokowi is not a contestant, this narrative seems irrelevant. What's more, I think there will be many opportunities for new models of populism to emerge. For example, besides Anies Baswedan, there are other figures who are quite strong in Ganjar Pranowo and Prabowo Subianto. Especially for Ganjar Pranowo, we can say that Ganjar Pranowo is a populist figure because of his direct interaction with the public through social media. Similar to Jokowi, the main narrative of Ganjar Pranowo is on nationalism and tolerance, a narrative that contrasts with the image attached to Anies Baswedan. However, the unique thing is that Ganjar Pranowo does not really carry a narrative as a successor or criticize Jokowi. Ganjar Pranowo stands with a narrative he built himself as a pluralist figure. Even so, Ridwan Kamil did not mention the old elite or the elite currently in power, but Ridwan Kamil could still enter the populist leader category.<\/p>\n

What happened to Ganjar Pranowo and Ridwan Kamil shows one important thing, that contemporary politics has landscape <\/em>different politics than eight or ten years ago. Especially when compared to politics when populism was growing in Latin America, or when Jokowi ran for Governor of DKI Jakarta in 2012. Changes landscape <\/em>this is what deserves to be observed, is the increasingly strong social media pushing the evolution of populism? Should we redefine populism based on the political arena attached to it? Or can we still use the generic definition of populism to read the movements of the political elite in 2024?<\/p>\n

These questions certainly require serious elaboration. If landscape <\/em>influential, then maybe Anies Baswedan can let go of the trap of religious populism that clings to him, but it could also be the other way around. This short article attempts to spark further questions that we need to ponder, especially when we talk about populism and political contestation. Like other concepts working in political science, the definition of the concept of populism will eventually need to be reviewed for its relevance in reading contemporary political practice.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Reference<\/strong><\/p>\n

Asia Today, 9 July 2022, SCBD Jakarta, a Slum Area that Turns into a Classy Business Center, https:\/\/asiatoday.id\/read\/scbd-jakarta-kawasan-kumuh-yang-menjelma-jadi-pusat-bisnis-mentereng<\/a><\/p>\n

BBC, 18 March 2021, 0 Rupiah Down Payment House Jakarta \u2013 realistic or political pretext? https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/indonesia\/indonesia-56434618<\/a><\/p>\n

News One, 26 November 2021, This is the Amount of the DKI APBD from Year to Year in the Anies Era, https:\/\/www.beritasatu.com\/megapolitan\/859349\/ini-besaran-apbd-dki-dari-tahun-ke-tahun-di-era-anies<\/a><\/p>\n

CNN Indonesia, 1 December 2022, 212 Reunion Committee Gives Reasons for Not Inviting Anies Baswedan, https:\/\/www.cnnindonesia.com\/nasional\/20221201070845-20-881161\/panitia-reuni-212-beber-alasan-tak-undang-anies-baswedan<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Hamid, A. (2019). Populism in the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election. Journal of Governance, 4(1), 1-15.<\/p>\n

Imawan, RP. Behind the Will of the People: Links Between Populism and Public Policy in DKI Jakarta, in Budiman, H (ed.). (2020), It's Dusk in Jakarta: Ideology, Public Policy, Politics, and the Capital City, Jakarta: Yayasan Torch Indonesia<\/p>\n

Ministry of Finance, 26 April 2021, Why does DKI Jakarta have such a large budget, https:\/\/djpk.kemenkeu.go.id\/?epkb_post_type_1=mengapa-dana-dki-jakarta-bisa-sangat-jauh-dengan-yg-lainnya-apa-yg-bisa-jd-argumen-kuat-mengapa-dki-jakarta-bisa-memiliki-anggaran-yg-begitu-besar-dan-jauh-dibandingkan-dengan-provinsi-lainnya<\/a><\/p>\n

Kompas, 16 February 2021, Remembering Jokowi's Efforts to Make Esemka a National Car, https:\/\/nasional.kompas.com\/read\/2021\/02\/16\/09425521\/mengenang-upaya-jokowi-yang-berencana-jadikan-esemka-mobil-nasional<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Kompas, 28 August 2022, Anies Campaign Promise about the 0 Percent DP House Changing to Rusunawa Development, https:\/\/megapolitan.kompas.com\/read\/2022\/08\/20\/06000061\/janji-kampanye-anies-soal-rumah-dp-0-persen-yang-berubah-ke-pembangunan?page=all<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Muhtadi, B. (2019). Populism, identity politics, and electoral dynamics: unraveling the long road of procedural democracy. Intrans Publishing.<\/p>\n

Populi Center, 19 October 2022, Release of DKI Jakarta Survey: Important Issues and Political Dynamics of Jakarta, https:\/\/populicenter.org\/2022\/10\/19\/rilis-survei-permasalahan-penting-dan-dinamika-politik-jakarta\/<\/a><\/p>\n

Populi Center, 26 October 2022, Release of National Survey: Evaluation of Three Years of Joko Widodo's Performance \u2013 KH. Ma'ruf Amin and Political Dynamics Ahead of the 2024 Election, https:\/\/populicenter.org\/2022\/10\/26\/evaluasi-tiga-tahun-kinerja-joko-widodo-kh-maruf-amin-dan-dinamika-politik-menjelang-pemilu-2024\/<\/a><\/p>\n

Populi Center, 9 February 2022, Release of DKI Jakarta Survey: Evaluation of DKI Jakarta Provincial Government's Performance and Political Map Towards the 2024 Pilgub, https:\/\/populicenter.org\/2022\/02\/09\/rilis-survei-populi-center-9-februari-2022\/<\/a><\/p>\n

Tempo, 10 August 2020, Alluding to Anies' Victory in 2017, PA 212: Colored by Our Movement, https:\/\/metro.tempo.co\/read\/1374245\/singgung-kemenangan-anies-di-2017-pa-212-diwarnai-gerakan-kami<\/a><\/p>\n

Triantoro, DA (2019). Identity Politics Practices in Anies-Sandi's Social Media Accounts. Journal of Communication Studies, 16(1), 19-40.<\/p>\n

Tribun News, December 3, 2021, absent twice, observers call Anies keeping his distance for the 2024 presidential election, PA 212: don't think of us as enemies, https:\/\/bogor.tribunnews.com\/2021\/12\/03\/dua-kali-absen-pengamat-sebut-anies-jaga-jarak-demi-pilpres-2024-pa-212-jangan-anggap-kami-musuh<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Triwibowo, A., & Martha, J. (2021). The Use of Populism as a Pragmatist Approach in Indonesia. Insignia: Journal of International Relations, 8(2), 101-116.<\/a><\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Dibandingkan daerah-daerah lain di Indonesia, DKI Jakarta menjadi magnet yang menggoda bagi para pengadu nasib dari seluruh penjuru nusantara. Hingga saat artikel ini ditulis, DKI Jakarta masih menjadi simpul politik dan ekonomi menyatu. Kawasan Sudirman Central Bussiness District (SCBD) misalnya, dapat dikatakan bahwa bisnis-bisnis besar di Indonesia dijalankan di kawasan ini, di samping tentu saja […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":6814,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-6699","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-opini"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/populicenter.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6699","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/populicenter.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/populicenter.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/populicenter.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/populicenter.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=6699"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"http:\/\/populicenter.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6699\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":6702,"href":"http:\/\/populicenter.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6699\/revisions\/6702"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/populicenter.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/6814"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/populicenter.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6699"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/populicenter.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=6699"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/populicenter.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=6699"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}