Barely months into his presidency, Prabowo Subianto has swiftly consolidated power in Indonesia. His oversized cabinet filled with loyalists, a muted opposition and expansive welfare programs highlight his preference for centralised governance. While these moves project strength, they risk straining Indonesia\u2019s fiscal health, testing the patience of a fragile party coalition, and alienating Indonesia\u2019 digitally-savvy youth voters.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
As Prabowo eyes re-election in 2029, his greatest challenge may not be defeating rivals but managing the contradictions of his own strategy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In 2029, Prabowo will be 77 years old, which would make him Indonesia\u2019s oldest elected president. This amplifies the stakes of his governance. Every decision he makes during this presidential term will shape whether he is remembered as the leader who solidified Indonesia\u2019s resilience and growth or one whose rule crumbled under its own contradictions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Prabowo owes his presidency largely to his predecessor, Joko \u2018Jokowi\u2019 Widodo. Exit polls revealed that over 40 per cent of Prabowo\u2019s voters backed him primarily to continue Jokowi\u2019s policy agenda.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Yet this reliance on borrowed political capital is a double-edged sword. To keep these decisive voters, Prabowo must uphold Jokowi\u2019s socio-economic pragmatism, including prudent fiscal management, while maintaining household purchasing power. But his early choices suggest otherwise. His expanding the appointment of military officers to civilian roles in the government and increasing military involvement in social programs \u2014 alongside passing a revision to military laws to facilitate these moves \u2014 indicate a turn towards securitised governance. If Prabowo drifts too far from Jokowi\u2019s technocratic-populist model, he risks losing key voters who backed him as a continuity candidate rather than a return to New Order-style authoritarianism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The president\u2019s position is complicated by Vice President Gibran Rakabuming Raka, Jokowi\u2019s son. Gibran\u2019s presence ensures access to his father\u2019s voter base but fuels accusations of dynastic politics. Surveys show a significant proportion of millennials and Gen Z express concern over nepotism and elite entrenchment. Should Prabowo position Gibran as his successor, he risks backlash from reformers. But should Gibran be sidelined, Prabowo may fracture his coalition, which includes Jokowi\u2019s vast constituency in key electoral communities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Prabowo\u2019s flagship Free Nutritious Meal program aims to feed 82 million children and pregnant women. With costs estimated at 10 per cent of the annual national budget, its feasibility is questionable. Rather than implementing the program in phases, Prabowo instituted cuts across the government to fund full coverage by the end of 2025. This establishes \u2018for the people\u2019 credentials but risks destabilising institutions and economic sectors \u2014 not to mention coalition partners whose patronage networks are compromised.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The government\u2019s gamble is that expanded welfare will offset public frustration over job scarcity. Prospective Gen Z employees face persistent underemployment challenges \u2014 low wages, minimal protections and scant skill development. Prabowo\u2019s promise to create 19 million jobs by 2029 hinges on attracting high-value investments. Yet his decision to retain Jokowi\u2019s ban on raw mineral exports has yet to drive significant investments or job expansion in domestic critical minerals processing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Prabowo has an inherent generational distance from his core constituency. By 2029, millennials and Gen Z would comprise two-thirds of Indonesia\u2019s electorate. Unlike older voters who experienced the chaotic post-Suharto reformasi<\/em> years, these digital natives prioritise economic mobility, digital freedom and transparent governance. Surveys by Populix and IDN Research Institute reveal that these groups consistently demand stronger anti-corruption measures, improved job opportunities and unrestricted internet access.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Prabowo appears to be heading in the opposite direction. Deliberations to revise the Broadcasting Law would expand the government\u2019s power to block \u2018disruptive\u2019 online content. Under the guise of cybersecurity, the government \u2014 with deep military involvement \u2014 appears poised to tighten control over online discourse. Such moves risk provoking a backlash akin to Thailand\u2019s 2020 youth protests. With 73 per cent of Indonesians active on social media and the third-highest TikTok usage globally, Prabowo\u2019s team cannot afford to lose this support base.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Prabowo\u2019s sprawling \u2018Big Tent\u2019 coalition may struggle to maintain cohesion. The cast of diverse actors \u2014 nationalist technocrats, Islamic conservatives and regional power brokers \u2014 has bred ideological tensions. Islamic parties may push for greater moral regulation, alienating secular elites and business interests. Growing unease among civilian allies over the military\u2019s expanding footprint in government could fracture elite consensus.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Trump administration\u2019s imposition of a 32 per cent tariff on Indonesian exports to the United States \u2014 dominated by rubber, electronics and low-end manufacturing \u2014 has exacerbated economic fragility. The Jakarta Composite Index has faltered amid capital flight and investor uncertainty, while fiscal pressures mount from an overstretched welfare agenda. As global supply chains rewire towards US-aligned economies, Indonesia faces revenue shocks and rising costs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Beyond direct trade impacts, Indonesia will also be affected by the intensifying US\u2013China rivalry. The US strategic trajectory with massive tariffs signals a hardening posture that risks deepening strategic polarisation. As China responds with regional overtures, Southeast Asia could become a contested frontier. For Indonesia, navigating this rivalry without provoking disruption may prove as consequential as managing its domestic economic agenda.<\/p>\n\n\n\n History shows that leaders who centralise power often mistake compliance for loyalty. Prabowo\u2019s model \u2014 military-backed welfare populism \u2014 may keep him popular until the first major crisis. The 1998 Asian Financial Crisis, which toppled his father-in-law, began with similar assurances of stability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the early months of his presidential term, Prabowo appears to hold the advantage. The public has praised him and the opposition remains ineffective. But the path to the next election looks fraught. If he wants his presidency remembered not just for power but for progress, he must address the demands of Indonesia\u2019s youth, build economic resilience and growth, resist autocratic shortcuts and navigate treacherous geopolitical dynamics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Adi Abidin is public policy specialist at Kiroyan Partners and research fellow at Populi Center. The opinions expressed in this article are his own.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n EAF | Indonesia | Prabowo\u2019s tightrope walk to 2029<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Barely months into his presidency, Prabowo Subianto has swiftly consolidated power in Indonesia. 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