Book Review: Popular Politics and the Institutionalization of Democracy in Indonesia

Populist movements in a country cannot be separated from the historical background of the country. For example, populist movements in northern countries (northern countries) which are relatively developed countries, in contrast to southern countries (southern countries) which are often considered as developing countries. The division between northern and southern countries has also become a separate debate among social scientists. However, if we use the wave of democratization proposed by Samuel Huntington as a framework for argumentation, then the broad categorization of northern and southern countries becomes relevant to reading the development of populism.

In contrast to existing studies of populism, especially in viewing the development of populism, most studies of populism see it attached to conceptual developments and case studies that are attached to studies of socialism, especially in the Latin American region (Pappas, 2016, p.4-6). This book provides a different emphasis by linking the development of populism with the wave of democratization. In the wave of democratization, the thing that should be noted is the contradiction between classes that occurred during the democratization period. At the beginning of the founding of the Republic of Indonesia, there were several very strong mass movements, one of which was in the 1960s. Mass cultural movements, especially during the period of aliran politics (including the period when the 1955 election took place), ended when the New Order (Orba) came to power.

What the New Order did was not only to encourage political order through the fusion of three parties, but also to encourage social order. The fusion of three parties did not allow for the formation of mass movements/popular politics. After the end of the New Order, the reform period brought many opportunities as well as challenges for popular politics in Indonesia. This book seeks to look at the prospects of popular politics in Indonesia, especially by looking at two case studies, namely the success of KAJS (Social Security Action Committee) in Jakarta, and the case of the social contract in Solo (Solo Model), Joko Widodo (Jokowi) became a central figure in popular leadership. This book seeks to see the opportunities to apply the two models (Solo model and KAJS model) into a larger context.

Solo Model
In the Solo case model, the social contract between the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI P) and elements of civil society has been built for a long time. Especially considering that this area was a base area for the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in the 1950s and early 1960s. Under the control of the New Order regime, popular movements continued to try to fight the New Order's repressive model by opposing the Golongan Karya (Golkar) party. At the beginning of the reform, the pattern between parties and grassroots changed. Grassroots expect involvement in more transparent public policy processes. The implementation of the Development Planning Deliberation (Musrembang) allows for a medium for interaction between party elites and grassroots (Djani & Tornquist, 2017, p.13).

Despite having a base that was at odds with the New Order, the PDIP candidate did not immediately gain public support. Slamet Suryanto, a PDIP party administrator who wanted to compete as Mayor, did not gain support from the party, especially after being involved in corruption. This was replaced by a new figure, namely Jokowi who was paired with FX Hadi Rudyatmo, a figure who had a strong network within the party and had strong ties with the party's task force. This pair only won by a small margin, only a third of the number of voters in Solo. Although PDIP had control in the regional parliament, Jokowi-Hadi Rudyatmo continued to build direct support from the community through direct interaction. Direct interaction between Jokowi and elements of civil society allowed Jokowi to leapfrog local elites and clientelistic networks (ibid, 14). This strategy was successful, both pairs gained popular support in the next election with support reaching 90 percent of voters.

The victory was supported by elements of civil society that mainly brought up issues of the urban poor. This group became the main element of the extra-parliamentary movements that helped the pair win. At this stage, the institutionalization built through popular movements was successful, especially in relation to urban development involving the urban poor. In this context, popular movements have succeeded in pushing for changes towards deliberative democracy.

The fundamental question is whether the Solo model can be applied in a larger context. In the experience in DKI Jakarta, not all elements of civil society support one of the candidate pairs in the electoral moment. This is caused, among other things, by the lack of organization of these extra-parliamentary groups, especially in the electoral context. In the 2012 DKI Jakarta gubernatorial election, support from progressive civil society groups such as the Urban Poor People's Network was more in favor of Faisal Basri. When Faisal Basri failed to advance to the next round, support from these civil society groups shifted to Jokowi. Unlike his opponent (Fauzi Bowo), Jokowi promised health insurance (Jakarta Health Card) and education (Jakarta Smart Card) as programs to support the urban poor. In contrast to Fauzi Bowo who tried to encourage social solidarity.

The problem of implementing the Solo model in the context of the DKI Jakarta gubernatorial election lies in the differences in the character of civil society organizations. Civil society groups in DKI Jakarta are not well organized, like civil society groups in Solo. Therefore, popular policy controls such as visit, ineffective in the context of society in DKI Jakarta. Second, interaction with labor unions. The main problem is how to balance the demands of the Regional Minimum Wage (UMR) and other welfare programs (such as KJP and KJS). The problem in DKI Jakarta is the failure to build social relations between actors and the extra-parliamentary organizations that support them. This is different from the experience in Solo, especially the instant policy approach in DKI Jakarta. This results in the failure to build strong interactions between populist actors and their supporting extra-parliamentary groups.

In a different experience, the 2014 presidential election contestation brought Jokowi to a transactional dilemma. Popular politics cannot work in a larger context, namely the national context. No alliances were built between civil society as built in the social contract model in Solo or in DKI Jakarta. Jokowi's supporting elites have realized the popular power of Jokowi's figure, in this case the elites gave autonomy to Jokowi. However, considering the strong elite dominance in the national contestation, extra-parliamentary movements such as those in Solo and DKI Jakarta could not be formed.

KAJS Alliance
The KAJS alliance model refers to the period of 2010-2012 in Jakarta. This movement emerged when the national social security system (SJSN) during Megawati's era was hesitantly implemented by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) in 2009. During this period, the system had changed its name to BPJS and the process of ratifying this social security system was relatively slow. Until finally elements of civil society such as labor unions, farmers, fishermen, and student organizations created the KAJS alliance.

This movement received a lot of support from civil society elements, one of which was a charismatic figure like Rieke Diah Pitaloka. This movement was relatively short-lived, demanding a health insurance system that applies to all citizens. The problem with this alliance model is that civil society elements in the informal sector are not very involved. The success of this movement lies in the support and strong network of politicians and pressure from several influential unions, compared to the pressure generated by the alliance itself (ibid, p.23). This resulted in problems with the solidity of the alliance and in supervising the implementation of social security from 2011 to 2014.

In the case of KAJP, there was an attempt to replicate the movement in the 2014 Presidential election. Several extra-parliamentary organizations such as the Indonesian Workers' Council (MPBI) alliance and the National Consolidation of Labor Movements (KNGB) alliance pushed for regulations related to the UMR in 2012 and 2013. The problem was when these extra-parliamentary alliances supported Prabowo Subianto. This political support only provided concessions to elites from unions or labor alliances, while not contributing to the sustainability of the alliances that were formed.

Deliberative Democracy Space
The main idea in this book is in chapter New Challenges and Opportunities, in this section the main premise put forward is that the deliberative democracy effort built through popular political channels in elections at the national level, must again face elite domination. The strong elite domination makes the popular politics that are built unable to adopt the Solo model or the KAJS model. The social contract model carried out in Solo, cannot be adopted at the national level, when elite domination is getting stronger. Likewise with the KAJS model, it is impossible to be implemented at the national level, considering the fragmentation of the elements of civil society that vary greatly.

One path that can be taken, especially to encourage deliberative democracy is to build a new space for public involvement or participation. One example of a case taken in this book is the formulation of village funds. Popular control that was expected to occur with the Solo model or the KAJS model did not occur, instead public control emerged in the form of popular policies (Popular Policies).

In the conclusion, the author presents two main points. First, related to transactional popular, the case of the increasing difficulty of implementing an inclusive development model in the Solo case, makes the populist figure to make an agreement with civil society elements quickly. This is certainly in contrast to the conditions that occur in Solo. The Solo model can only work because the historical roots of the area allow for popular control (ibid, p.74). Second, the most realistic way to control development is by encouraging direct control to the rulers using popular power/popular control (ibid, p.76).

The idea of putting popular control, in line with the discussion from similar authors regarding the need to build block democracy which consists of activists from civil society elements (Tornquist, 2009). Block democracy It is hoped that this can provide a way to encourage popular control, especially when democracy is elitist. One of the main criticisms of the current democratic system is its increasingly elitist process and the loss of public control.

In general, this paper provides an interesting contribution, especially related to the aspect of popular politics in encouraging the formation of a more participatory (deliberative) democratic life order. The contribution of this study is in placing a positive contribution to the practice of popular politics, or in other words populism. Dominant studies place populism as something negative, especially considering that populism encourages weak horizontal control (between democratic institutions) and vertical control (direct control from the people to the government). The dominant narrative sees populism as a pathology of democracy, given its exclusive nature, using rhetoric that tends to be intolerant, racist, and xenophobic to legitimize their accusations against groups that are considered not in accordance with the political agenda of the populist group (Muhtadi, 2019, p.9).

The criticism of this paper lies in the imbalance between the two cases raised as the main supporting bases for the premises related to popular politics and the institutionalization of democracy. The discussion of the Solo model is more than the discussion of the KAJS alliance. The theoretical propositions discussed are quite interesting, only that in-depth elaboration of the existing cases should be done to strengthen the theoretical propositions offered.

This book provides answers to the answers stated in its title, namely related to the transactional dilemma. When populism is still in the local realm such as districts/cities, then the transactional is in pushing for the institutionalization of democracy. Likewise when it is in the provincial realm (DKI Jakarta), although the ties between populist figures and civil society elements are not immediately institutionalized as in the city of Solo. When it reaches the national level, then transactionalism has entered the elite realm, civil society elements are no longer powerless. Therefore, popular politics cannot effectively push for institutionalization. Here, populist figures are in a transactional dilemma, between the elite and civil society elements who still vaguely support them.

Bibliography
Djani, L, & Tornquist, O, (2017), Dilemmas of Populist Transactionalism: What are the prospects now for popular politics in Indonesia?, Yogyakarta: PolGov
Muhtadi, B., (2019). Populism, Identity Politics, and Electoral Dynamics: Unraveling the Long Road of Procedural Democracy. Malang: Intrans Publishing.
Pappas, TS, (2016). Modern populism: Research advances, conceptual and methodological pitfalls, and the minimum definition. In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics.
Törnquist, O., Warouw, N., Samadhi, WP (2009). Democracy on Sand: The Progress and Regression of Democratization in Indonesia. Power Conflict Democracy Publication.