Book Review: A New Way to Understand Populism

The term populism has, at least, been on the rise in the last decade. Scholars, as well as mass media reports, often label politicians, political parties, and political movements in various countries as populists. Interestingly, politicians, as well as their supporters, often attack each other using this terminology. In the United States, for example, Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders have been labeled populists by supporters of their political opponents. At this point, populism has appeared in almost all political actors. Such a phenomenon raises this question: Do political actors who compete to seize power automatically become populists? More specifically, what criteria can be used to assess whether one or two, or more, political actors are populists or not?

A series of questions are attempted to be answered by the book entitled “What Is Populism?” . Jan-Werner Müller’s work opens with his disagreement with the dominant literature discussing populism. The professor at Princeton University does not follow, or even questions, the general approach in viewing populism, namely the quality of policies proposed by politicians or political parties, sociological analysis that examines it from a class perspective, and socio-psychological aspects that focus on voters’ feelings, such as anger and fear (p. 10; pp. 14-18). Starting from there, Müller examines populism from the aspect of moral imagination claims. Here, populists consider themselves to represent the people who are morally higher than the elite, whose morals are lower (19-20).

Following this logic, criticizing the elite, or being anti-elite, is a criterion for determining a politician or political party as populist (3; 20). However, Müller does not stop there. This is because political actors can easily be grouped as populists if they only use this variable. If they were simply anti-elite, he said, all US presidential candidates would be labeled as populists (p. 3). Therefore, he added another variable: anti-pluralist. Here, populists claim that they, and only they, represent what they call 'the people' (p. 3; p. 20). As an illustration, at one of the AKP Party congresses, Turkish President Erdoğan made this statement to his critics – who are also Turkish people: "We are the people. Who are you?" . Instead of declaring themselves as representatives of a portion of the people, populists claim that they 100% represent the people (p. 3).

According to Müller, populism cannot be separated from representative democracy (modern democracy). At this point, populism is a negative consequence of representative democracy. This is because in modern democracy, political actors or political parties compete with each other for power. In that situation, no one can represent the entire people. In other words, political actors can only represent their constituents, which in this case are part of the people. However, once again, populists claim to be representatives of the 'people', not part of the people (76-77). From this explanation, Müller's position is very different from a number of scholars who consider populism in all its variations to have positive implications for democracy. Although starting from a different starting point, Dzur and Hendriks (2018: 339), for example, state that populism, more precisely thick populism - not thin populism , is not destructive, but even beneficial, to democracy. In thick populism, people organize themselves inclusively and non-violently to address social issues. As an illustration, a number of local residents in Victoria, Australia formed a community organization because political actors, such as politicians and political parties, ignored the local population. The organization, as a representative of the local population, aims to improve local democracy by increasing political awareness and listening to the aspirations of the local population (Dzur and Hendriks, 2018:340-41). If this phenomenon is viewed from Müller's perspective, then such a reality is not populism at all.

As mentioned earlier, populism, says Müller, is not only anti-elite, but also anti-pluralist. The latter variable gives rise to a number of consequences, and can even be described as dangerous. First, populists consider their political opponents illegitimate. When contesting for power, for example, populists claim that their competitors are immoral and corrupt (p. 3; p. 20). Here, populists delegitimize, even ' demonize ', their political opponents. When in power, populists are reluctant to acknowledge the legitimacy of the opposition (3; 20). Second, although it is not explicitly stated by populists, people who do not support populists will be considered as not being the people (p. 3; p. 20). This means that only people who are in line with the populist agenda are 'the people'. For example, when Nigel Farage, a British politician, stated that Brexit was a “victory for real people,” the status of those who opposed Brexit as people ultimately became questionable (pp. 21-22).

As when they are out of power, populists also still direct their attacks at the elites while in power, even though they have actually become elites at that point. Populist political actors, for example, often blame their failures on elites at home or abroad, and position themselves as victims. In contrast to the conventional view, Müller actually believes that populists can exercise or manage power (pp. 41-42). Specifically, according to Müller, populists have their own characteristics when in power. First, populists tend to control government institutions openly and emphasize the claim that they are the moral representatives of the 'people'. As an illustration, Viktor Orbán and his supporting party in Hungary changed the regulations to place loyal party supporters in a number of bureaucratic positions that should have been filled by non-partisans (pp. 44-45).

Second, populists tend to try to engage in mass clientelism practices, and these actions are carried out openly and on the basis of public moral justification. They only provide material or non-material assistance to their supporters. Because, for them, their only supporters are the people (46). In addition, populists also commit corruption, but these crimes do not seem to harm their reputation. Because, in the minds of their supporters, these actions are not a problem, as long as the corruption is seen to be carried out by populists, the moral representatives of the 'people', to 'us' and not to 'them', who are immoral. It is not surprising that in a number of cases, populists are actually more corrupt than the previously ruling elite, who were criticized as corrupt by populists (pp. 47-48). Third, and finally, populists delegitimize civil society groups that criticize them.

For populists, it is impossible for the 'people', whom they morally represent, to protest against the people who represent them. In a number of cases, populists often discredit civil society groups by accusing them of being foreign agents (p. 48). In the midst of this situation, non-populist politicians or political parties often build coalitions and exclude populist political actors from political activities. Rather than solving the problem, this method actually makes things worse. The credibility of populists will increase because they claim that non-populist political actors form a political 'cartel', and that ideologically the politicians or political parties in the coalition are no different (p. 83). Moreover, marginalizing populists will further reduce pluralism. This is because populists have already harmed it (p. 83).

Based on this reality, Müller offers a number of strategies in dealing with populists. First, as long as populists do not violate the law – calling for violence, for example – political actors, including mass media actors, need to engage or interact with them. After all, populists have constituents. If populists are ignored or excluded from the political system, their voters will assume that the 'elite' does not care about them. However, Müller emphasizes, this strategy is not carried out in the same way that populists communicate. At this point, the goal of discussing with populists is not to defeat populists, for example, in a political debate with arguments or data. Because, even though their voters are presented with data, this action does not necessarily degrade the image of populist politics in their eyes. However, that does not mean that presenting facts to voters is not necessary at all (pp. 83-84). What is more important, he continues, is to relate to populists at the symbolic level. At this point, non-populist political actors can engage by discussing what the fundamental commitments of the polity (form/process of civil/societal governance) are (p. 85). Second, identifying who are the political actors who are anti-elite and claim that 100% represents the people and who are not.

In addition, Müller also emphasized the importance of limiting the power of the rich, and building a new social contract for those who are excluded (pp. 98-99). However, what needs to be underlined is that a number of strategies proposed by Müller are based on his explanation of the history, as well as the conditions that allow, the emergence of populism in the United States and Europe. At this point, Müller's solution does not specifically highlight cases of populism in developing countries. In addition, when compared to the first solution, the second solution he offers does not elaborate much on how to operate it in the field.

It must be admitted, although not based on a strict empirical study, this book can be a guide and provide new theoretical understanding for anyone interested in the theme of populism that is rampant, or intersecting, in politics lately. Müller has opened a new path in understanding populism, it remains how researchers prove or develop his views in the field with a series of research.

Reference

Dzur, Albert W. & Hendriks, Carolyn M. 2018. Thick Populism: Democracy-Enhancing Popular Participation. Policy Studies, 39(3), 334-351.